Introduction: A New Empire in Old Clothes The Russian Federation has systematically constructed a neo-colonial architecture across the Middle East and Africa that rivals the imperial projects of the nineteenth century while operating under the rhetorical cover of anti-imperialism. This architecture rests upon three interlocking pillars: the cultivation of relationships with designated terrorist organizations including Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthi movement; the establishment and maintenance of permanent military infrastructure in Syria; and the extraction of natural resources from Syria and African nations to finance the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine. The Russian state has refined a model of influence that combines diplomatic protection for extremist groups, proxy military forces operating under commercial cover, and energy infrastructure control that extends from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea. The relationship between Moscow and Hamas represents a particularly instructive case study in how the Kremlin operationalizes its anti-Western agenda. Russia has refused to designate Hamas as a terrorist organization, a position that distinguishes it from the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom. This refusal is not rooted in any principled objection to the group’s methods. It reflects instead a calculated strategic decision to maintain channels of communication and influence with actors that can disrupt American-led regional order. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has observed that Moscow’s relationship with Hamas forms part of a broader Middle East strategy designed to enhance Russia’s standing in the Global South, an effort that has long involved building ties with both Israel and its sworn enemies. The October 7, 2023 attack on Israel, which resulted in the deaths of approximately 1,200 people and the abduction of over 250 hostages, created a diplomatic opening that the Kremlin exploited with remarkable speed. While Russian nationals were among the victims, and Muscovites laid flowers at the Israeli embassy in Moscow, the Kremlin declined to condemn Hamas’s actions, expressing only “grave concerns”. This response contrasted sharply with the condemnations issued by Western capitals and signaled to Hamas and its patrons in Tehran that Moscow would not join the international effort to isolate the group. Part I: The Financial Architecture of Terror Direct Funding Channels and Charitable Cover The financial relationship between Russia and Hamas operates through multiple channels that exploit gaps in international banking oversight and charitable regulation. A Russian charity known as Rusar has been identified as providing funds intended for Gaza residents to an individual named Abu Zahhar, with a transfer documented in December 2025. Abu Zahhar claimed that the funds were used to purchase blankets for children, but the arrangement raises serious questions about the diversion of charitable resources to Hamas-controlled entities. The Rusar Foundation has been characterized as antisemitic by Israeli media, and the pattern of transfers through individual intermediaries rather than recognized humanitarian organizations suggests a deliberate effort to obscure the ultimate destination of the money. The scale of Russian fundraising for Gaza-related causes is substantial. According to Russian media reports cited by Israeli sources, online donations collected on a monthly basis exceeded ten million rubles. The collection of such sums through digital platforms operating in Moscow, Yekaterinburg, and Almaty creates a parallel financial system that operates outside conventional banking channels. These funds are channeled into conflict areas in Syria, Afghanistan, and parts of Africa, with a portion ultimately reaching Gaza. The post-Soviet transition created fertile conditions for the emergence of these informal financial networks, characterized by weak border control and socio-political fragmentation that transnational terrorist groups have exploited. The Oil-for-Terror Pipeline The most significant financial mechanism linking Russia to Hamas operates through a complex oil trading network that involves Iranian state entities, Russian companies, and the Syrian government. The United States Department of the Treasury has designated nine targets in an international network through which the Iranian regime, working with Russian companies, provides millions of barrels of oil to the Syrian government. The Assad regime, in turn, facilitates the movement of hundreds of millions of dollars to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force for onward transfer to Hamas and Hezbollah. The central figure in this scheme is a Syrian national named Mohammad Amer Alchwiki, who operates a Russia-based company called Global Vision Group. Alchwiki and his company serve as critical nodes in both the delivery of oil from Iran to Syria and the transfer of funds to the IRGC-QF’s lethal proxies. The Treasury Department’s designation of these actors in 2025 represented the first comprehensive effort to expose the financial plumbing that connects Russian commercial interests, Iranian state resources, Syrian governmental facilitation, and designated terrorist organizations. The sophistication of this network reflects years of refinement. Central Bank of Iran officials have played a direct role in facilitating the scheme, at one point using a company whose name suggested a trade in humanitarian goods as a tool for financial transfers. The Russian component of the network provides essential services including shipping, insurance, and financial intermediation that Iranian entities could not access directly due to sanctions. The Treasury Department warned the maritime community that participation in shipping oil to the Syrian government carried grave consequences, but the network has proven resilient to successive rounds of sanctions. Cryptocurrency and the Evasion of Oversight German security services have concluded that Russia has utilized cryptocurrency exchanges as instruments in its hybrid war against the West, with these platforms serving as conduits for financing terrorism including support for Hamas. The use of digital currencies allows the Kremlin and its proxies to circumvent traditional banking oversight and to move value across borders without triggering the reporting requirements that govern conventional financial institutions. The anonymity provided by cryptocurrency transactions creates particular challenges for intelligence agencies seeking to trace the flow of funds from Russian donors to Hamas operatives in Gaza. The integration of cryptocurrency into Russia’s financial support for Hamas mirrors similar methods employed by Hezbollah and the Houthi movement. The Middle East Institute has documented how Iran’s Axis of Resistance has evolved into a decentralized network sustained by a gray-zone economy of oil smuggling, cryptocurrency, and reconstruction contracts. Iranian companies linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps continue to finance Lebanese Hezbollah, the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, and the Yemeni Houthis through semi-licit markets, ensuring operational resilience despite public fatigue and economic strain. Russian facilitation of these financial flows provides a critical service to the broader Iranian proxy network of which Hamas forms an integral part. Part II: Diplomatic Protection and Political Legitimacy The Refusal to Designate Hamas as Terrorist Russia’s refusal to designate Hamas as a terrorist organization constitutes one of the most significant forms of support that Moscow provides to the group. This refusal carries enormous practical and symbolic consequences. Practically, it allows Russian officials to meet openly with Hamas representatives without triggering domestic legal prohibitions. Symbolically, it challenges the international consensus that Hamas is a terrorist organization and provides the group with a form of legitimacy that it cannot obtain from Western governments. The Kremlin has hosted Hamas delegations on multiple occasions, with the Russian Foreign Ministry confirming at least two such visits in recent months. These meetings provide Hamas with international recognition that extends beyond its traditional patrons in Tehran and Doha. When Putin hosted freed Gaza hostages in April 2025, he urged one of the released individuals to “thank Hamas” for the release and praised the group’s “goodwill”. Such statements blur the distinction between hostage-taking as a criminal act and the negotiation of hostage releases as a humanitarian gesture. The diplomatic support that Russia provides to Hamas must be understood within the broader context of the Kremlin’s efforts to position itself as a champion of the Global South against Western dominance. Russia and China, according to the Counter Extremism Project, offer Hamas diplomatic support that is rooted in ambitions to erode US power, prestige, and influence rather than in natural ideological opposition to Israel. This assessment is confirmed by the observation that both Russia and China maintain diplomatic and economic relations with Israel even as they cultivate ties with Hamas. The relationship with Hamas serves instrumental purposes that have little to do with genuine commitment to Palestinian self-determination. The Normalization of Assad and the Principle of Non-Intervention Russia’s legal justification for its military intervention in Syria provides a template for the legitimization of neo-colonial control. Russia strategically appropriated the dominant legal interpretation of the post-Cold War period to reproduce its standing within the world order, leveraging the colonial foundations of the international legal system to assert dominance over other polities. The Russian discourse on Syria drew upon Westphalian notions of sovereignty and equality, functioning as the lowest common denominator that could connect Russia to universal international law while depoliticizing the Syrian civil war and equating Assad with any democratically elected state leader. This legalistic approach served multiple purposes. It provided cover for military intervention that violated Syrian sovereignty while simultaneously positioning Russia as a defender of sovereignty against Western interventionism. The articulation of equivalence between military action and adherence to international law, between support to opposition groups and respect for sovereignty, allowed Moscow to claim the moral high ground while pursuing objectives that were fundamentally about power projection and resource extraction. The case of Syria illustrates Russia’s position in the international order as a power that can play on both sides of the West/non-West divide, possessing hybrid qualities that even China does not. Russia’s unique position enables it to adapt easily and rapidly to overarching global trends and controversies, articulating resentment against the West while reproducing principal parts of the very colonial legacies it claims to oppose. Part III: Military Infrastructure and Territorial Control The Tartus Naval Base and Hmeimim Airbase The preservation of Russian military bases in Syria represents the most concrete manifestation of Moscow’s neo-colonial presence in the Middle East. Under a memorandum of understanding signed with Syria’s transitional government, Russia’s navy retains access to the port of Tartus while the Defense Ministry continues to use the Hmeimim airfield as a transit hub to service operations in Africa. The accord creates a long-term legal basis for Russia’s presence in Syria while establishing ties with the new Syrian government, reflecting a pragmatic adaptation to the post-Assad political landscape. Tartus is the only Russian naval base in the Mediterranean, and Moscow has retained a presence there since 1983 during the Soviet era. The Hmeimim airbase was established in 2015 when Russia intervened militarily to support the Assad regime, using it to conduct bombing operations against opposition forces. The original 49-year leases awarded by the Assad regime in 2017 were rendered legally worthless by his overthrow in December 2024, but Putin’s negotiators successfully secured a new arrangement with the transitional government led by Ahmed Al-Sharaa. Retaining these bases represents a major strategic success for Putin, who sought to preserve a strategic foothold in the Mediterranean following the collapse of his ally’s regime. The facilities allow Russia to project power across the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Africa, serving as logistical hubs for military operations far beyond Syria’s borders. The agreement to convert the bases into “joint training and qualification centers” within three months represents a face-saving formula that allows both Moscow and Damascus to claim that the arrangement respects Syrian sovereignty while preserving Russian operational capacity. Russian Military Footprint and Troop Deployments At its peak, the Russian military presence in Syria included approximately 10,000 soldiers deployed across two main bases and smaller outposts throughout the country. This deployment allowed Russia to protect the Assad regime from internal and external threats while securing Russian access to strategic resources and infrastructure. The Russian military enjoyed a form of diplomatic immunity at their bases in Syria and were able to moor up to eleven ships at Tartus. The reduction of Russia’s military presence following the fall of Assad reflects the broader strain that the war in Ukraine has placed on Russian military resources. Putin’s inability or unwillingness to save Assad underscored how badly Russia’s military had been depleted by its war against Ukraine. Yet the preservation of the bases demonstrates that even a weakened Russia can maintain strategic positions when the local governing authority perceives value in continued Russian engagement. The new Syrian authorities did not demand an immediate Russian withdrawal, recognizing that Russian training and equipment could contribute to their own security objectives. Part IV: The Wagner Group and Resource Extraction A Commercial Cover for Military Operations The Wagner Group and its successor entities have served as Russia’s primary instruments for resource extraction across the Middle East and Africa. Wagner established an entrenched military presence in Syria, Libya, and Sudan, with its contractors guarding strategically valuable oil and mining facilities. The evisceration of Wagner’s senior leadership following Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death in August 2023 did not lead to the withdrawal of its military contractors, since they continue to protect the same assets that generate revenue for the Kremlin’s war machine. In Syria, Wagner operated through a network of front companies including Evro Polis LLC, which served as a commercial cover for the group’s activities. Sanad Protection and Security Services, a Syrian private security company established in 2017 and controlled by Wagner, was active in protecting Russian interests including phosphate mining operations. These commercial entities allowed Russia to maintain plausible deniability while securing control over Syrian resources. African Gold and the Financing of War The extraction of African gold has become a critical source of revenue for Russia’s war effort. Since its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has extracted and exported at least $2.5 billion worth of gold from Africa through illicit operations facilitated by its paramilitary forces. Russian mercenaries from the former Wagner Group and the “Bears” brigade are responsible for mining, protecting, and smuggling gold from small artisanal mines in Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Eritrea, Guinea, Libya, Mali, and Sudan. The gold is smuggled to Middle Eastern countries, primarily the United Arab Emirates, where it is refined and mixed with legally obtained metal before being sold in Dubai. The proceeds from these transactions are transferred to Russia, where they help finance the war against Ukraine. This circuit of extraction, smuggling, refining, and financial repatriation represents a sophisticated system for converting natural resources into military capability while evading international sanctions. The human cost of this extraction is staggering. In the Central African Republic, Russian mercenaries have committed numerous crimes while guarding gold mines, including the robbery and brutal murder of a local gold and diamond trader. The severed head of the victim was placed between his legs, and photographs of the ritually arranged corpse were published online as a warning to others. In June 2024, Wagner mercenaries killed at least twenty gold miners at small mines in Koki, Ouham prefecture, and gathered the villagers to announce that anyone mining gold without their permission would be executed. Syria’s Resource Extraction Under Russian Control Russia’s resource extraction in Syria has followed a similar pattern. Russia sought to acquire Syrian natural resources including Mediterranean gas, phosphate mines, and the port of Tartus by signing agreements with terms highly unfavorable to the Syrian economy. Russia took control of the Al-Thawra oil field and the Tuenan gas field in Al-Raqqa, and Syrian phosphate mining in the Khneifis and al-Sharqiyah mines came under Russian control following military clashes. As of 2025, Syria’s external debt stood at $22.3 billion, with at least $1.2 billion owed to Russia according to a World Bank assessment. This debt relationship provides Moscow with leverage over the Syrian government and creates dependency that facilitates continued resource extraction. Even after Assad’s fall, Russia preserves its Syrian energy influence, with tankers delivering approximately 100,000 tons of diesel and 100,000 tons of crude shipped by Gazprom Neft, a company once oriented toward European markets. Part V: The Iranian Nexus and Proxy Warfare The Axis of Resistance and Russian Support Russia’s relationship with Hamas cannot be understood in isolation from its broader partnership with Iran and the network of proxy forces that Tehran has cultivated across the Middle East. Iran funds, trains, and equips groups in Lebanon, Gaza, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria as part of a decades-long strategy. These groups include Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, and Shiite militias operating in Iraq and Syria. Russia has expanded military cooperation with Iran through fighter jets, helicopters, and air defense systems. An Iranian official confirmed the transfer of ballistic missiles to Russia, stating openly: “We give missiles to Hezbollah, Hamas, and Hashd al-Shaabi, so why not give them to Russia?”. This statement reveals the transactional nature of the relationship and the extent to which Russia has integrated itself into Iran’s weapons proliferation networks. The partnership between Russia and Iran, formalized through a 20-year strategic agreement, includes numerous military and technological cooperation provisions. However, the strategic partnership lacks a mutual defense provision, reflecting Russia’s preference for transactional relationships that do not obligate it to come to Iran’s defense. Russia used Hezbollah and the Houthis as low-cost tools for geopolitical disruption while withholding meaningful protection when these actors faced severe retaliation. Weapons Proliferation to Proxy Forces Israeli operations in Lebanon have uncovered extensive evidence of Russian weapons proliferation to Hezbollah. Russian weapons alone constituted an estimated 60 to 70 percent of the Hezbollah weapons confiscated in southern Lebanon, prompting major concerns about Russian-Iranian weapons proliferation to proxy militias. The discovery of a large Hezbollah weapons depot containing Russian-manufactured arms confirmed what intelligence agencies had long suspected about the depth of Russian involvement in arming Iran’s proxies. The weapons transfer networks that supply Hezbollah also supply Hamas. Russia is believed to have supplied Hamas with weapons that the group used during its October 7 attack on Israel. The scale and sophistication of the weapons used in that attack surprised many analysts, and the Russian connection provides one explanation for how Hamas was able to acquire military capabilities that exceeded what would normally be available to a blockaded territory. Part VI: Energy Geopolitics and the Weaponization of Chaos The Strategic Benefits of Regional Instability Russia has derived substantial strategic and economic benefits from instability in the Middle East. The war between Iran and Israel, which erupted in 2025 and continued into 2026, drove global oil prices above $100 per barrel, lifting revenues for Russia’s heavily sanctioned exports. Attacks on tankers in the Strait of Hormuz and strikes on energy infrastructure helped drive a global energy shock that benefited Russian financial interests. Putin has been eager to cast Russia as a potential mediator in the region while simultaneously benefiting from the chaos. He held calls with the presidents of Iran, the United States, and the United Arab Emirates, as well as with the emir of Qatar, the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, and the king of Bahrain. This diplomatic activity allows Russia to position itself as an indispensable player in regional affairs while its proxies and partners contribute to the instability that generates economic benefits. Hanna Notte, director of the Eurasia nonproliferation program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, has observed: “I think Russia sees short-term benefits in this war. There are elevated oil prices and Patriot interceptors are being diverted to the Middle East, alongside political attention”. The diversion of Western military resources to the Middle East reduces the pressure on Russian forces in Ukraine and creates opportunities for Russian advances on that front. The Energy Leverage Strategy Russia’s energy strategy in the Middle East extends beyond simply benefiting from price spikes. Moscow aims to secure benefits from the Strait of Hormuz crisis to gain additional leverage in negotiations on its war against Ukraine. By maintaining close ties with Iran while also cultivating relationships with Gulf states, Russia positions itself as a broker that can influence energy flows and prices. The Kremlin has viewed Tehran as its main ally in the Middle East, but it also balances relationships with other Gulf states. This balancing act allows Russia to maximize its influence across the region while avoiding overcommitment to any single actor. The strategic partnership with Iran provides access to Iranian markets and military cooperation, while relationships with Saudi Arabia and the UAE provide investment opportunities and diplomatic cover. Part VII: The Colonial Continuity Anti-Colonial Rhetoric and Colonial Practice Russia presents itself to the Global South as an anti-imperial and anti-colonial force, positioning itself as a champion of decolonization. Yet Russia was and remains a colonial empire, and its actions in the Middle East and Africa reproduce the extractive relationships that characterized European colonialism. The Kremlin seeks to compromise democracy in the eyes of Middle Eastern societies, viewing it as a contagion that must be contained. To achieve this, the Kremlin attempts to associate democracy with colonialism and imperialism, a narrative that appears particularly cynical during Russia’s own war against Ukraine. Russia’s approach to the Middle East rests upon geography and is at least partially motivated by a desire to reduce the presence and weight of the United States and its Western allies in the region. The goal is not to liberate the region from colonial domination but to replace one set of external powers with another. Russia’s legalistic imperialism seeks to construct a sense of equivalence with its imperial competitors, appropriating the dominant legal interpretation to reproduce its standing within the world order. Neocolonialism in Practice The Russian intervention in Syria has been characterized as a neocolonial act that places Russia on the same side of history as the United States, France, and England. The argument that Russian intervention was justified by the need to stop the Islamic State and the imperial offensive in the region does not alter the fundamental character of the intervention as an exercise in external domination. The use of mercenaries from Syria to fight in other theaters represents another dimension of Russia’s colonial practice. Both Russia and Turkey have endeavored to recruit Syrians and send them to other battlefields, treating Syrian lives as expendable resources for the pursuit of imperial objectives. This practice recalls the colonial employment of native troops in the service of empire, and it reflects the same logic of extraction and exploitation. Part VIII: The Global Implications The Threat to International Order Russia’s support for Hamas and its broader network of relationships with radical Islamic organizations poses a fundamental threat to the international order. The financial networks that sustain Hamas operate through the same channels that Russia uses to evade sanctions and finance its war against Ukraine. The weapons that reach Hezbollah and Hamas through Russian-Iranian networks could be used against any target that Russia deems hostile to its interests. The integration of Russia into the Iranian proxy network means that any effort to counter Hamas, Hezbollah, or the Houthis must also address the Russian dimension of their support. Sanctions that target only Iranian entities will be insufficient as long as Russian companies and financial institutions continue to provide essential services to the network. The Treasury Department’s designation of the Russia-Iran oil network represented an important step, but it must be followed by more comprehensive measures. The Failure of Western Policy The fragmented Western policy toward the region has allowed Russia to exploit divisions among the United States, the European Union, and their allies. The Middle East Institute has observed that an effective counter-strategy must move beyond punitive sanctions toward systemic disruption, targeting the networked financing, narrative legitimacy, and state capture mechanisms that underpin Tehran’s enduring regional power. Such a strategy would necessarily require addressing the Russian role in sustaining these networks. The lack of coordinated political will to stop the illicit flow of profits from resource exploitation in Africa to the Russian military machine is striking. The failure to act allows Russia to continue funding its war against Ukraine through the extraction of African gold and Syrian resources while simultaneously supporting terrorist organizations that destabilize the Middle East.